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Introduction
Cryptographic protocol analysis is a well-developed subject, with many tools and rigorous techniques that can be used to determine what confidentiality, authentication (among others, [RGL16a, EMM09, Bla02, CM12]), and indistinguishability properties (e.g. [Bla04, BAF08, CCcCK16] ) that a protocol satisfies. However, protocols are used to support security functionality required by the applications that use those protocols. Those applications may have access control and authorization goals, and the real criterion for whether a protocol is good enough for that usage is whether these application-level requirements are always met. For instance, in the TLS resumption attacks [RRDO10] , cf. [BDLF + 14, RGL16b], the protocol did not allow the server application to distinguish unauthenticated input at the beginning of a data stream from subsequent authenticated input. This may lead to erroneous authorization decisions.
Another area in which application behavior affects protocol goals concerns environmental assumptions. For instance, some protocols fail if the same longterm key is ever used by a principal when playing the server role, and it has been used when playing a client role. However, an application may ensure that no server ever needs to execute the protocol in the client role at all. This policy would ensure that an otherwise weak protocol reliably supports the needs for the application.
Logical Protocol Analysis is our term for combining a protocol analyzer with these additional concerns, which we analyze via model finding. Our goal is to analyze cryptographic protocols that include trust axioms that cannot be stated using the typical input to a protocol analyzer such as cpsa.
An Example: DoorSEP. We turn next to a motivating scenario, complete details of which may be found in Section 2.2. We begin here by describing the protocol, called the Door Simple Example Protocol (DoorSEP). It is derived from an expository protocol due to Bruno Blanchet [Bla08] , who designed it to have a weakness. We will illustrate conditions under which, despite this weakness, the protocol achieves the needs of the application.
Imagine a door D which is equipped with a badge reader, and a person P who is equipped with a badge. When the person swipes the badge, the cryptographic protocol is executed. The door and person are each identified by the public part of an asymmetric key pair, with D −1 and P −1 being the respective principal's private keys. We write {|M |} K for the encryption of message M with key K. A message M is signed by P by encrypting with P 's private key ({|M |} P −1 ).
The person initiates the exchange by creating a fresh symmetric key K, signing it, and sending it to the door encrypted with the door's public key. The door extracts the symmetric key after checking the signature, freshly generates a token T , and sends it to the person encrypted with the symmetric key. The person demonstrates they are authorized to enter by decrypting the token and sending it as plain text to the door. DoorSEP may be expressed in Alice and Bob notation:
An analysis of DoorSEP by cpsa shows an undesirable execution of this protocol. Assume the person's private key P −1 is uncompromised and the door has received the token it sent out. In this situation, cpsa will deduce that person P freshly created the symmetric key K. However, there is nothing in this protocol to ensure that the person meant to open door D. If adversary A gets P to use compromised door D ′ , the adversary can perform a man-in-themiddle attack:
Without additional assumptions, the door cannot authenticate the person requesting entry.
But think about this situation: Can we trust the person to swipe her badge only in front of the door that matches the badge? Can we ensure that that door has an uncompromised private key? If so, then the adversary cannot exercise the flaw.
We regard this as a trust assumption, and we can express it as an axiom:
If an uncompromised signing key P −1 is used to prepare an instance of the first DoorSEP message, then its owning principal has ensured that the selected door D has an uncompromised private key.
The responsibility for ensuring the truth of this axiom may be split between the person and the organization controlling the door. The person makes sure to swipe her badge only at legitimate doors of the organziation's buildings. The organization maintains a security posture that protects the corresponding private keys.
Is DoorSEP good enough given the trust axiom? To analyze this protocol with this trust assumption we rely on model finding. We provide a theory to Razor that generates a model that specifies the manin-the-middle attack. To the theory, we add an axiom that states that when a person generates a symmetric key, that person will use an uncompromised key to encrypt its first message. The axiom makes it so that the adversary cannot decrypt the message sent by the person.
The generated model can be given to cpsa. It infers that the only way the door can decrypt the person's message is if the person encrypted the message using the door's public key. Once that inference is made, the door can conclude that the person sent the messages expected in a run of this protocol.
DoorSEP was constructed with a flaw for expository purposes. The protocol can be repaired by including the door's public key in the signed content, by making the first message {|{|K, D|} P −1 |} D .
Flawed protocols are often deployed, and may be embedded in widely used devices before the flaws are understood. This example shows that such protocols can still achieve desired security goals when used in a restricted context. If the context can be modeled using trust axioms, Logical Protocol Analysis can be used to check whether the goals are in fact met in the context of use.
Protocols and theories. Hence, security conclusions require protocol analysis combined with other properties, which we will assume are characterized axiomatically by a theory G. In the DoorSEP case, it is generated by the trust axiom. We also regard a protocol Π as determining an axiomatic theory T h(Π), namely the theory of Π's executions, as Π runs possibly in the presence of a malicious adversary. The models of this theory are runs of the protocol. Thus, we would like to understand the joint models of G ∪ T h(Π), where of course these theories may share vocabulary.
The enrich-by-need strategy. Indeed, our approach is to construct minimal models in a homomorphism order. We refer to these minimal models as shapes [Gut11] . The shapes show all of the minimal, essentially different things that can happen subject to G ∪ T h(Π): every execution contains instancesmeaning homomorphic images-of the shapes. This is useful to the security analyst who can inspect the minimal models and appraise whether they are compatible with his needs. The analyst can do this even without being able to explicitly state the key security goals. In the case in which G = ∅, so that only T h(Π) matters, generating these shapes is the central functionality of cpsa [RGL16a] .
We call this approach to security analysis enrich-by-need, since we build homomorphism-minimal models by rising stepwise in the homomorphism order, gradually generating them all. cpsa does so using a "authentication test" method, which yields a compact, uniform way to generate the set of minimal models of the protocol theory [Gut11, LRT11] .
Indeed, a further advantage arises in the case where there is a finite set of finite shapes. In that case, we can summarize them in a sentence, called a shape analysis sentence constructed as the disjunction of their diagrams [Gut14, Ram12] . The diagram of a finite model is (roughly) the conjunction of the atomic formulas true in it. The shape analysis sentence is thus true in all of the shapes. Moreover, its syntactic form ensures that its truth will be preserved by homomorphisms. Thus, it will be true in all models of G ∪ T h(Π). Indeed, no strictly stronger formula can be true in all the models. We regard the shape analysis as a security goal achieved by G ∪ T h(Π).
Thus, finding a finite set of finite shapes determines a strongest security goal that the system achieves.
We already have a special tool, called cpsa [RG17] , that computes the shapes and their sentences for a protocol Π acting alone. It uses optimized algorithms that we have proved correct for protocol analysis [Gut11, LRT11] . Thus, we need to extend it so that it can cooperate with another tool to adapt its results to provide models of the whole theory G ∪ T h(Π). We effectively split T h(Π) into two parts, a hard part T h and an easy part T e . Only cpsa will handle the hard part.
Our strategy is to program Z3 [DMB08] to look for minimal models of G ∪ T e that extend a fragment of a model. When the resulting model A contains additional behavior of Π, we return to cpsa to handle the hard part T h , enriching A with some possible executions. We then return these extensions to Z3. If this process terminates, we have a minimal joint model. By iterating our search, we obtain a covering set of minimal joint models.
The program that orchestrates this use of Z3 is called Razor. It adapts the ideas of an earlier program of the same name [SDD15] .
Contributions. This report has two goals. First, we define and justify the methods that the new Razor uses to drive Z3 to generate homomorphismminimal models of a given theory. These homomorphisms are not necessarily embeddings; that is, a homomorphism to construct may map distinct values in its source model to the same value in its target model. To begin with, we need a method to construct, from a model A, a set of sentences avoid A , true in precisely those models B such that there is no homomorphism from A to B. We also need a method to construct, from a model A, a set of sentences homTo A , true in precisely those models B such that there is a homomorphism from B to A. We show how to use these two resources to compute a set of minimal models that covers all of the models; this method is codified in Razor.
Second, we develop a particular architecture for coordinating Razor and cpsa. In this architecture, Razor handles all aspects of G ∪ T h(Π) except that it does not enrich a fragmentary execution of Π to obtain its shapes, i.e. the minimal executions that are its images. Instead, we generate an input to cpsa that contains the substructure A 0 containing only protocol behavior. cpsa computes the shapes and extracts the strongest security goal that applies to A 0 . It returns this additional information to Razor, which then iterates. We call this cooperative architecture lpa for Logical Protocol Analysis.
Conclusions. We draw two main conclusions. First, Razor uses Z3 effectively to extract minimal models of a variety of theories. This is particularly true if the theories do not contain many nested universal quantifiers. Moreover, the lpa coordination between cpsa and Razor is sound.
Second, when Razor and cpsa are used together as in lpa, Z3 must handle theories with a fairly large number of nested universal quantifiers. Therefore this method is practical in its current form only for quite small examples. Refining the approach may enable us to generate theories-possibly quantifier-free theories-that are smaller and more easily digested by Z3.
Structure of this report. We organize the report into two main chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the theories T h(Π), explains the way that lpa marshals Razor and cpsa together. Chapter 3 describes Razor's strategies to use Z3 for finding minimal models, relative to a given theory T . Chapter 4 summarizes and concludes.
Within Chapter 2, we introduce strand space theory and give its axiomatic presentation in Section 2.1. In Section 2.2, we introduce an example that uses Blanchet's Simple Example Protocol as a tool in an authorization decision, namely whether to open a locked door. The protocol is chosen so that it would not necessarily be sound. However, the analysis shows that the protocol is good enough given an additional application-specific trust assumption. This is the assumption that, every time an authorized principal interacts with a door, that door complies with the protocol and preserves the secrecy of the values it is given. This illustrates how protocol analysis may be crafted to an applicationspecific context.
Within Chapter 3, we lay the foundations in Section 3.1, focusing on core models. These are canonical homomorphism-minimal submodels, which have embeddings into their homomorphic images. We are, however, more interested in homomorphisms that may not be embeddings; we introduce this notion of minimality in Section 3.2. This section shows how to compute minimality models in either the embedding sense or the sense of all homomorphisms. We then turn from the theory to the implementation considerations of working with the SMT solver Z3 or other SMT2-lib-compliant solvers. Section 3.5 gives numerical results for DoorSEP and some other small examples.
Model Finding Modulo Strand Space Theory
This chapter shows how to use the model finders presented in Chapter 3 and Strand Spaces [THG99] to analyze cryptographic protocols. The implications of trust policies expressed in first-order logic can be analyzed by studying their models. A trust policy that includes a theory about a cryptographic protocol allows one to determine the impact of the policy on the execution of a protocol. However, deducing protocol executions is not something that can be efficiently done within an smt solver. An external, finely tuned tool is called for.
The Cryptographic Protocol Shapes Analyzer [RG17] (cpsa) is a tool that can be used to determine if a protocol achieves authentication and secrecy goals. It performs symbolic cryptographic analysis based on the Dolev-Yao adversary model [DY83] and Strand Spaces. Determining if a protocol satisfies a goal is an undecidable problem, however, cpsa appears to have a performance advantage over other tools by using forward reasoning based on solving authentication tests [GT02] .
cpsa begins an analysis with a description of a protocol and an initial scenario. The initial scenario is a partial description of the execution of a protocol. If cpsa terminates, it computes a description of all of the executions of the protocol consistent with the initial scenario. For example, if it is assumed that one role of a protocol runs to completion and cpsa terminates, cpsa will determine what other roles must have executed.
Associated with each cpsa protocol Π is a first-order language L(Π) used to [Gut14] . The language can be used to exchange information between cpsa and an smt solver.
A security goal is a sentence with a special form. It is a universally quantified implication. Its hypothesis is a conjunction of atomic formulas. Its conclusion is a disjunction of existentially quantified conjunctions of atomic formulas. Security goals can be used to express authentication and secrecy goals.
cpsa describes a set of executions with an object called a skeleton. A skeleton that explicitly describes all of the non-adversarial behavior in each execution is called a realized skeleton. Skeletons are presented in Section 2.1.2.
A Tarski style semantics, one that uses a skeleton as a model for a sentence, is defined for each goal language. A security goal is achieved by a protocol if every realized skeleton models the goal. The goal language is presented in Section 2.1.3.
For use with smt solvers, there is a theory T Π for protocol Π. When this theory is included, models restricted to L(Π) characterize a skeleton of Π. The theory associated with a protocol is presented in Section 2.1.5.
The goal language used by lpa is strand-oriented as opposed to being nodeoriented. The distinction is presented in Section 2.1.6 along with the motivation for choosing a strand-oriented language.
There is a special security goal that can be extracted from the results of a run of cpsa. A Shape Analysis Sentence (sas) [Ram12] encodes everything that has been learned about the protocol from a cpsa analysis starting with a given initial scenario. A sas is used to import the results of a cpsa analysis into the smt solver.
The architecture for combining an smt solver with cpsa, called the Logical Protocol Analyzer (lpa), is displayed in Figure 1 . Theories are expressed using smt-lib 2.5 syntax. An analysis begins with a cpsa protocol Π and an initial theory T 0 . The initial theory contains a specification of the trust policy and a description of the initial scenario of the protocol as a collection of sentences in L + (Π), an extension of L(Π).
The program prot2smt2 extracts the protocol theory T Π . The initial theory is appended to the protocol theory to form the first theory T 1 to be analyzed by Razor, the model finder. A skeleton is extracted from each model. If the skeleton is realized, the model describes the impact of the trust policy on complete executions of the protocol. If the skeleton is not realized, it is used as the initial scenario for cpsa. The results of cpsa is turned into a sas and added to the current theory for further analysis. The lpa algorithm is presented in Section 2.1.4. An example of the use of lpa is in Section 2.2.
The performance of lpa is not good. Model finding consumes a large amount of cpu time, even for small problems. Section 3.5 presents the results from running our test suite and an analysis of lpa's performance issues.
Strand Space Theory
This section describes the theory behind the strand-oriented implementation of lpa. Unlike [Gut14] , this paper uses many-sorted first order logic, which is a better match for existing software tools. This paper incorporates much from [Ram12] . Unlike [Ram12] , this paper uses one-based sequence indexing.
Notation.
A finite sequence is a function from an initial segment of the positive integers (Z + ). The length of a sequence X is |X|, and sometimes we write sequence X = X(1), . . . , X(n) for n = |X|. The prefix of sequence X of length n is X † n.
Message Algebras
Sorts: Figure 2 shows the simplification of the cpsa message algebra signature used by lpa. Sort M is the sort of messages. The other sorts, sort A (asymmetric keys), sort S (symmetric keys), and sort T (text), are called basic sorts.
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Figure 3: Adversary Derivability Relation
A message constructed by applying a term of a basic sort to an inclusion function is call a basic value. Messages are generated from the basic values using encryption {| · |}
{S,A} (·)
and pairing (·, ·), where the comma function is right associative and parentheses are omitted when the context permits.
A set of variables X is well-sorted if for each x ∈ X, x has a unique sort S. Let x : S assert that the sort of x is S in X. Suppose X and Y are well-sorted and contain x. The sort of x in X need not agree with the sort of x in Y .
Let A(X) be the quotient term algebra generated by a set of well-sorted variables X. We often leave the set of variables implicit, and refer to the carrier set for sort S by A S .
A message t 1 is carried by t 2 , written t 1 ⊑ t 2 if t 1 can be derived from t 2 given the right set of keys, that is ⊑ is the smallest reflexive, transitive relation such that
Adversary behavior is modeled via a derivability relation. Given a set of messages S, message t is derivable, written S ⊢ t, when there is a derivation using the rules in Figure 3 . These rules encode the Dolev-Yao model [DY83] .
Strand Spaces
A run of a protocol is viewed as an exchange of messages by a finite set of local sessions of the protocol. Each local session is called a strand. A strand is a finite sequence of events. An event is either a message transmission or a reception. Outbound message t ∈ A M is written as +t, and inbound message t is written as −t. A message originates in a strand if it is carried by some event and the first event in which it is carried is outbound. A message is acquired in a strand if it is carried by some event and the first event in which it is carried is inbound.
A strand space Θ is a finite sequence of strands. A message that originates in exactly one strand of Θ is uniquely originating, and represents a freshly chosen value. A message is mentioned in Θ if it occurs in a strand of Θ, or if it is an asymmetric key, its inverse occurs in a strand of Θ. A message that is mentioned but originates nowhere in Θ is non-originating, and often represents an uncompromised key.
A node identifies an event in a strand space. A node is a pair of positive integers, and the event associated with node (s, i) is evt Θ (s, i) = Θ(s)(i). We sometimes omit the strand space when it is obvious from the context. The set of nodes of strand space Θ is The strand succession relation is the binary relation ⇒ :
An execution is called a bundle. A bundle B(Θ, →) is a strand space Θ and a binary communication relation → : N (Θ) × N (Θ), such that 1. the graph with N (Θ) as vertices and ⇒ ∪ → as edges is acyclic; 2. if n 0 → n 1 , then evt(n 0 ) = +t and evt (n 1 ) = −t for some t; and 3. for each reception node n 1 , there is a unique transmission node n 0 with n 0 → n 1 .
The node precedence relation of B, ≺ B = (⇒ ∪ →) + , is a strict partial ordering of nodes and represents the causal relation between events that occur at nodes in B. In a bundle, a strand that is an instance of a role in Figure 4 is called a penetrator strand, and the remaining strands are regular. In what follows, we assume all regular strands precede penetrator strands in the sequence of strands Θ, that is, if Θ s is regular and Θ s ′ is a penetrator strand, then s < s ′ . A skeleton represents all or part of the regular portion of an execution. A skeleton k = k X (Θ, ≺, ν, υ), where X is a set of well-sorted variables used to generate the message algebra used by Θ, ≺ is a strict partial ordering of the nodes in Θ, ν is a set of basic values mentioned in Θ, none of which is carried in a strand in Θ, and υ is a set of pairs consisting of a basic value and a node. For each (t, n) ∈ υ, t originates at n in Θ and at no other node. In addition, ≺ must order the node for each event that receives a uniquely originating basic value after the node of its transmission, so as to model the idea that the basic value represents a value freshly generated when it is transmitted.
Skeleton 
There is a skeleton homomorphism (ϕ, σ) : k → k ′ if ϕ and σ are maps with the following properties:
1. ϕ maps strands of k into those of k ′ , and nodes as ϕ(
is a message algebra homomorphism;
Skeleton k covers bundle B if there exists a homomorphism from k to the skeleton of B. Skeleton k is realized iff there is an injective homomorphism to the skeleton of some bundle that preserves the length of strands.
A protocol Π is a strand space with restrictions and a theory. The details of the theory of Π, written T Π , will be presented in the next section. A strand i of Π, written Π i is called a role. A role is a strand where every variable of sort message that occurs in the strand is acquired. Strand s is an instance of role Π i if s is a prefix of the result of applying some substitution σ to Π i . Every protocol contains the listener role −x, +x for x : M.
Skeleton k is a skeleton of protocol Π if each strand in Θ is an instance of a protocol role, and k models theory T Π as defined in the next section.
Protocol Formulas
The signature Σ(Π) used for strand-oriented protocol (sop) formulas includes of the sorts and functions in the underlying message algebra. There are two additional sorts: D, the sort for strands and I, the sort for indices. A node is never explicitly represented, instead it is represented as a pair consisting of a strand and an index.
sop formulas make use of protocol specific and protocol independent predicates. For each role Π i , there is a protocol specific binary strand length predicate Π i : D × I. For each role Π i and variable x : S that occurs in Π i , there is a protocol specific binary strand parameter predicate Π x i : D × S. The protocol independent unary predicates are nonB : B for each basic sort B ∈ {T, S, A}. The ternary protocol independent predicates are uniqAtB : B × D × I. The quaternary protocol independent predicate is prec : D × I × D × I. Equality is part of the signature. Finally, there is a constant of sort I for each index in the longest role of the protocol. Thus, suppose the longest role has length n, then 1 : I, 2 : I, . . . , n : I are constants in the signature.
Semantics of Protocol Formulas. Let k = k X (Θ, ≺, ν, υ). The universe of discourse D contains a set for each sort in Σ(Π). For sort D, D D is the domain of Θ. D I is the set of integers that correspond to the constants of sort I. The universe of discourse D S for each algebra sort S is A(X) S .
When formula Φ is satisfied in skeleton k with variable assignment α:Y → D, we write k, α |= Π Φ. We writeᾱ when α is extended to terms in the obvious way. When sentence Γ is modeled by skeleton k, we write k |= Π Γ.
• k, α |= Π Π i (y, j) iff for some s = α(y) and σ, s is in the domain of Θ, and Θ s †ᾱ(j) = σ(Π i †ᾱ(j)).
• k, α |= Π Π x i (y, t) iff for some s = α(y) and σ, s is in the domain of Θ, x first occurs in Π i at j, and for some σ with σ(x) =ᾱ(t),
The interpretation of the protocol independent predicates is straightforward.
• k, α |= Π nonT(t) iff tt(ᾱ(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |= Π nonS(t) iff sk(ᾱ(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |= Π nonA(t) iff ak(ᾱ(t)) ∈ ν.
• k, α |= Π y = z iffᾱ(y) =ᾱ(z).
Associated Protocol Theories. In addition to a sequence of roles, protocol Π has an associated theory T Π . For example, the axiom
states that the n parameter of an instance of role Π 1 always uniquely originates at its first node.
Logical Protocol Analysis
The protocol theory of protocol Π, Tr(Π) is:
where Υ(Π) is the theory of Π-skeletons presented in Section 2.1.5.
For each protocol Π, ideally one would like to perform model finding modulo Th(Π). The lpa program performs our approximation.
The inputs to lpa are a protocol Π and an initial theory T 0 . The signature of the initial theory,Σ(Π) may extend the signature of protocol formulas with new sorts, functions, and predicates. The additional functions and predicates are treated as uninterpreted symbols.
Suppose M models Γ (M |= Γ). We denote by M ⇓ Σ(Π) the reduct of M to Σ(Π) by restricting it to interpret only symbols in Σ(Π). Assume each element in the domain of model M is distinct from a function inΣ(Π). LetΣ(Π) + be the extension ofΣ(Π) in which each element in the model is a constant of the appropriate sort. The positive diagram of M, D(M), is the set of all of the atomicΣ(Π) + sentences modeled by M. Given a set of atomic Σ(Π) + Φ sentences, Guttman [Gut14, Section 4.3] describes when and how one can extract a skeleton k = cs(Φ) that is characterized by Φ.
lpa starts with theory T 1 . It is the union of initial theory T 0 , T Π , and Υ(Π), the Π-skeleton theory presented in Section 2.1.5. Algorithm 1. lpa performs the following procedure to output a set of models.
If Γ is not role specific, signal initial theory error and abort.
(c) Use cs(Γ) as the point-of-view for cpsa and compute the resulting shape analysis sentence ∆ using the algorithm in [Ram12] .
(d) lpa(T ∪ {∆}).
Skeleton Axioms
This section presents the Π-skeleton theory, Υ(Π), used to form an initial theory by lpa. For performance reasons, the signature used omits the message sort M along with all message algebra functions that refer to that sort. The only message algebra function that remains is asymmetric key inverse (·) −1 . This simplification of the protocol signature was necessary because model finders attempt to create an infinite domain for the message sort using the obvious specification.
There are three new binary predicates introduced in this section, predicates carriedAtB : B × D × I, for each basic sort B ∈ {T, S, A}. Formula carriedAtT(b, x, i) asserts that text b is first carried in strand x by the message at position i. Finally, there is an index precedence predicate ≪ :
In what follows, prec(·, ·, ·, ·) is written as (·, ·) ≺ (·, ·).
1. All message functions are injective.
3. Index constants enumerate the sort. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n, ∀x : I. ∃i. x = c i and c i = c j when i = j.
4. Index constants are linearly ordered. For all 1 ≤ i, j ≤ n,
5. Uniquely originating values originate at at most one node:
for S ∈ {T, S, A}.
6. Carried implies not non-origination:
Precedence is strict:
∀x : D, i : I.(x, i) ≺ (x, i) ∀xyz : D, ijk : I.(x, i) ≺ (y, j) ∧ (y, j) ≺ (z, k) ⊃ (x, i) ≺ (z, k).
Strand succession rule:
9. Node of unique origination is before carried node:
10. Strand predecessor node exists for Π i :
11. Non-overlapping role pairs respect node positions:
• If Π i † 1 does not unify with Π j † 1,
• If ℓ is the largest position such that Π i † ℓ unifies with Π j † ℓ,
12. Parameter first occurrence node:
• If v : S first occurs in Π i at ℓ, where ℓ > 1,
13. There is at most one value for each parameter:
14. Assert first carried node: Assume basic value b : S is first carried in Π i at ℓ, v is the variable that occurs in b, and n = m if b = v else n = m −1 .
• If ℓ = 1,
• If ℓ > 1,
Let Υ(Π) be the collection of axioms listed above in this section. Observe that Υ(Π) is geometric. Let Γ be aΣ(Π) sentence. Model M is a k skeleton model of Γ, written M |= k Γ, iff M |= Γ ∧ Υ(Π) and k = cs(D(M ⇓ Σ(Π))).
Strand-Oriented vs. Node-Oriented Goal Languages
A goal language is strand-oriented if non-algebra logical variables denote strands. A goal language is node-oriented if non-algebra logical variables denote nodes.
In the original work on goal languages [Gut14] , all languages are nodeoriented. Node-oriented languages are to be preferred when considering protocol transformations, that is, when mapping one protocol into a larger protocol, and ensuring the goals in the source protocol are properly reflected in the target protocol. cpsa version 3 [RGL16a] provides a node-oriented goal language. The first implementation of lpa used cpsa3 and a node-oriented goal language.
The goal language presented is Section 2.1.3 is strand-oriented. Strandoriented languages have the advantage that they are more compact and easier door person Figure 5 : DoorSEP Protocol to understand. Furthermore, they align more naturally with cpsa input and output, which itself is strand-oriented. cpsa version 4 [RG17] provides a strandoriented goal language. The reason cpsa4 came into existence is not due to positive features of strand-oriented languages, but instead it was to mitigate the lpa performance issues. Strand-oriented models of skeletons produced by Z3 are smaller than node-oriented models. Section 3.5 contains an example in which a strand-oriented analysis is sixteen times faster that a node-oriented analysis.
Door Simple Example Protocol
We present the DoorSEP Protocol example, and its analysis in full detail based on the foundation presented in the previous section. In this example, imagine there is a door with a badge reader, and a person with a badge. The door has opened. We want to know what else must have happened.
Recall the diagram in Figure 1 to visualize the analysis process.
To begin this analysis, we must know how the person's badge was used to authenticate. We employ the protocol in Figure 5 , which has been designed to have a flaw. It is based on the Simple Example Protocol due to Bruno Blanchet. It fails to achieve mutual authentication, however, we will add a trust axiom that restores this property.
In this protocol, a person begins by generating a fresh symmetric key, signing it, and then encrypting the result using the door's public key. If the door accepts the first message, it responds by freshly generating a token and uses the symmetric key to encrypt it. If the door receives the token back unencypted, the door concludes the person that generated the key is at the door and opens.
The initial theory specifies the trust axiom and the fact that the door is open. To assert the door is open, one asserts there is a strand that is a full length instance of the door role by declaring constant s:D and asserting door(s, c 3 ). We further assume a person's private key is uncompromised by declaring constant 
and will be explained later. After appending the initial theory to the Skeleton Axioms for the DoorSEP protocol specified in Section 2.1.5, Razor finds the model in Figure 6 . The first line declares the set of elements in the domain. The second line shows the properties we depend on for integers. The third line shows that we have two pairs of asymmetric keys. The forth line asserts we have an instance of the door role of full length. The remainder asserts properties of basic values and the orderings implied by strand succession.
At this stage, we have a model that characterizes an unrealized skeleton, and we would like to use cpsa to find out what else must have happened. Ignoring atomic formulas using the predicates carriedAtT, carriedAtS, and ≪ produces a model in the language of the DoorSEP protocol. The Skeleton Axioms ensure the extraction of a skeleton that can be used as an initial cpsa scenario. The shape produced by cpsa is displayed in Figure 7 .
The shape shows the lack of mutual authentication built into this flawed Consider the case in which the door is well known to the owner of the badge. For example, suppose the badge is issued by the institution that owns the door and is tamper proof. In that case, the person knows to initiate the DoorSEP protocol (swipe their badge) only when in front of a door with the correct key. The trust axiom in Eq. 1 codifies this policy. It states that if a person with an uncompromised key initiates the protocol, the door key used is uncompromised.
The next step in the analysis makes use of the trust axiom. The result of the cpsa analysis is transformed into the sas shown in Figure 8 . The antecedent specifies the initial scenario described by the first model. The consequence specifies what else must be added to make the initial scenario into the complete execution show in Figure 7 .
When the sas is added to the current theory, Razor finds one model. The skeleton extracted from this model is very similar to the shape in Figure 7 with one crucial difference: the key D ′ is uncompromised. This skeleton is unrealized, so cpsa can make a contribution. It finds a sas that extends the length of the person strand to full length and equates D and D ′ . The addition of this sas produces a model that characterizes a realized skeleton with full agreement between the door and person strands. Because the skeleton is realized, cpsa has nothing more to contribute and the analysis terminates.
Finding Minimal Models
Below we will assume familiarity with basic ideas and results from first-order mathematical logic; notions that are not defined here are treated in any text on logic. There are some variations in the formalities of different presentations in the literature, but definitions in the SMT-Lib standard [BFT16] line up particularly well with our notation.
In this chapter we present some of the foundations of model-finding, focusing on the use of a Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) solver. In broadest terms, model-finding is the following task: given a logical theory T , produce one or more (finite) models of T .
Of course a typical satisfiable theory will have many models. Special emphasis is given in this chapter to the question of which models should be presented to the user? One answer-embodied in the lpa tool-is based on the fundamental notion of homomorphism between models, with a special emphasis on models that are minimal (see Section 3.2) in the pre-order determined by homomorphism. Section 3.3 addresses some of the strategies we evolved in programming against an SMT solver.
Foundations
Language
We work with many-sorted first-order logic. Concretely, we implement the logic defined in the SMT-Lib standard, version 2, as described in [BST + 10]. This logic is not order-sorted: sorts are all disjoint, and models must have all sortinterpretations be non-empty.
The SMT-LIB language adopts the convention that all expressions are terms, and the "formulas" are, by convention, terms of sort Bool. For softwareengineering reasons we have found it beneficial to work with terms and formulas as separate types. The translation is straightforward, of course, and so Razor does the following
• when theories are loaded from user's input files (or intermediate files created by our tool), the theory is translated from a "term-based" one to a "term-and-formula-based" one, which is manipulated internally;
• when theories are sent to the SMT solver they are translated back to being a "term-based" one Certain classes of formulas and theories play a special role in our tool.
Definition 2 (PE formula, Geometric theory). A formula is positive-existential, or PE, if it is built from atomic formulas (including true and false) using ∧, ∨ and ∃. A theory T is geometric if has an axiomatization in which each axiom is of the form
where α and β are positive-existential.
Models
Fix a signature Σ. A model M for signature Σ will be called a Σ-model ; notation M |= Σ. Let T be an Σ-theory. We are interested in categories of models of T ; for the most part we only consider finite models.
Notation 3.
If α is a formula with free variables among x 1 , . . . , x n and a 1 , . . . , a n are elements of a model A we will sometimes write A |= α[a 1 , . . . , a n ] as shorthand to mean that A |= α(x 1 , . . . , x n ) under the environment sending each x i to a i . If we enrich ch M with a suitable conjunct expressing the fact that the elements named by the constants are all distinct, we obtain the i-characteristic sentence ch i M of M.
Homomorphisms
Definition 5. Let A and B be Σ-models. A function h : |A| → |B| is a homomorphism if
. . , h(a n )] = h(a) and 2. A |= R[a 1 , . . . , a n ] implies B |= R[h(a 1 ), . . . , h(a n )].
It is a strong homomorphism if the second condition is replaced by 1 2' A |= R[a 1 , . . . , a n ] if and only if B |= R[h(a 1 ), . . . , h(a n )].
( The first condition is already equivalent to "if and only if.") Definition 6. A homomorphism from a model to itself is called an endomorphism.
An embedding e : A → B is a strong homomorphism which is injective. An isomorphism f : A → B is a homomorphism such that there is a homo-
Note that an isomorphism is not the same as a bijective homomorphism (it is the same as a bijective strong homomorphism). On the other hand:
Lemma 7. Let A and B be finite. If h : A → B and g : B → A are injective homomorphisms, then they are isomorphisms.
Proof. It will be enough to prove that h is an isomorphism. We use the following elementary fact: if f : X → X is an injective set-theoretic function on a finite set, then for some n, f n : X → X is the identity. So consider g • h : A → A. This is an injection, so for some n, (g • h)
n is the identity on A. So (g • h)
n−1 • g is h −1 . Since this function is a composition of homomorphisms, it is a homomorphism. Thus h is an isomorphism.
Categories of Models
Since the identity map is injective and injective maps are closed under composition, the class of Σ-models under injective maps makes a category.
Notation 8.
• M Σ is the category of all finite models of Σ with arbitrary homomorphisms.
Write A B (sometimes B A) if there is a M Σ map h : A → B.
Write A ≈ B if A B and B A.
Write A B if A B and not B A.
• M i Σ is the category of all finite models of Σ with injective homomorphisms. 
Well-foundedness of the homomorphism preorder
We will often add axioms to a theory to ensure that there is an upper bound on the size of its models. In such a case there will be only finitely many models of T .
Lemma 11. Let T be a theory with only finitely many models. Then the and i orders on models of T are well-founded.
Proof. Suppose for the sake of contradiction that we have an infinite descending chain of strict homomorphisms:
Then we have M i+k M i for any k ≥ 0. Since T has finitely many models, we eventually get i and k ≥ 0 with
The same argument applies to i as well.
Homomorphisms and Logical Form
Theorem 12. The following are equivalent, for a formula α( x):
1. α is preserved by homomorphism: if h : A → B is a homomorphism, and a is a vector of elements from A such that
2. α is logically equivalent to a PE formula.
3. α is equivalent, in the category M Σ of finite models, to a PE formula.
Proof. The equivalence of (1) and (2) is a classical result in model theory when considering arbitrary models. The equivalence of (1) and (3) is a deep result of Rossman [Ros08] .
Lemma 13. Let M and N be arbitrary models.
• The following are equivalent.
M N.
2. N |= ch M .
3. ch N |= ch M .
Proof. For the assertions about unconstrained homomorphisms:
(1) implies (2): Any function h : |M| → |N| determines a way to instantiate in N the existentially quantified variables in ch M . When h is a homomorphism, this instantiation will make the body of ch M true, essentially by definition of homomorphism.
(2) implies (1): Suppose N |= ch M . Then the instantiation of the existentially quantified variables in ch M determines a function h : |M| → |N|. The fact that this instantiation makes the body of ch M true implies that h is a homomorphism.
(1) implies (3): Suppose M N. We want to show that for any P, P |= ch N entails P |= ch M . By the equivalence of (1) and (2) it suffices to show that N P entails M P. Since M N this follows from transitivity of .
(3) implies (2): this is clear, since N is a model of ch N . The proofs for the injective case are almost identical. The additional factor is that the "distinctness" assertions in the i-characteristic sentences ensure that the homomorphisms considered are injective.
Retractions and Cores
The notion of the core of a model is standard; it is important for us because cores give canonical representatives of ≈ equivalence classes.
Core are defined in terms of retractions, as follows.
Definition 14. A retraction r : A → B is a homomorphism such that there is a homomorphism e : B → A with r • e = id B .
The following are well-known facts about retractions. If r is a retraction then r is surjective and the corresponding e is injective. Indeed e is an embedding (though r need not be a strong homomorphism). If r is an endomorphism then r is a retraction if and only if r is idempotent: r • r = r; this is to say that r is the identity on its image.
It is false in general that if A is a model of T then a retraction of A is a model of T . But it does hold if T is geometric.
Lemma 15. Let T be a geometric theory, A |= T , and r : A → B a retraction. Then B |= T . The following will be useful later.
Lemma 16. If A is finite and h : A → A is an endomorphism then some power of h is a retraction.
Proof. By induction on the size of A. If h is injective, then some power of h is the identity, a retraction.
Otherwise suppose that h(e) = h(e ′ ) for some e, e ′ ∈ |A|. Let A ′ be the image of h, and let h ′ be h restricted to |A ′ |.
Then |A ′ | < |A| and h ′ is an endomorphism of A ′ . By induction, for some n, (h ′ ) n is a retraction. It follows that h 2n is a retraction; to show that it is idempotent we calculate:
Corollary 17. If h : A → A is a non-injective endomorphism then some power of h is a proper retraction.
The corollary was observed by Gottlob in [Got05] . It is useful in computing cores, as we will see later.
Definition 18. A submodel C of A is a core of A if there is a retraction r : A → C but no retract r ′ : A → C ′ for any proper submodel C ′ of C. A model C is a core if it is a core of itself.
By Lemma 15, if T is a geometric theory, and A is a model of T then the core of A is a model of T .
The following are well-known (see, for example, [HN92] in the case of graphs).
Lemma 19. Let A be finite.
1.
A has a core.
2. If C is a core of A then A ≈ C.
A core of A is an induced submodel of A.
4. C is a core if and only if it has no proper retracts.
5. C is a core if and only if it has no proper endomorphisms (equivalently, every endomorphsim of C is an embedding; equivalently every endomorphsim of C is an automorphism).
A submodel C of A is a core of A if there is an endomorphism
7. If C and C' are cores of a model A then C and C' are isomorphic.
Proof.
1. This holds for simple cardinality reasons.
2. This holds by definition of retraction.
3. This holds since the retraction is the identity on the core.
4. This is immediate from the definition.
5. By Lemma 16, a model C has no proper retracts if and only if it has no proper endomorphisms. Now apply the previous part.
6. If C is a core of A then by definition there is an endomorphism h : A → C; if there were h ′ : A → C ′ to a proper submodel C ′ of C then by Lemma 16, there would be a retraction to C', contradicting the definition of core.
If h : A → C but there is no endomorphism A → C ′ for any proper submodel C ′ of C, then C itself has no proper endomorphisms, so by part 5, C is a core. 7. Suppose r : A → C and r ′ : A → C ′ are retracts. Consider the map r ↾ C ′ , r restricted to C'. This is a homomorphism from C' to C. Similarly
is an endomorphism of C, hence is injective. The composition in the other order is injective as well, so, as observed in Lemma 7, each is an isomorphism.
Computing Cores
Testing whether a model is a core is NP-complete. So computing cores is apparently difficult, from a worst-case complexity perspective. But it is not difficult, using an SMT solver, to write a program that behaves well in practice.
Definition 20. If M is a finite model for signature Σ, the sentence endo M , over the signature Σ h that extends Σ by adding a new function symbol h s : S → S at each sort S, is the conjunction of
• the sentence expressing "h is a homomorphism", and
• the sentence expressing "h is not injective."
Algorithm 21 (ComputeCore).
input: model M over signature Σ output: a core P of M initialize: Set P to be M while endo P is satisfiable let P ′ be a model of endo P ; let P 0 be the image of endo P in P'; let P be the reduct of P 0 to the original signature Σ return P Lemma 22. Algorithm 21 computes a core of its input.
Proof. The algorithm terminates because the size of the model P decreases at each iteration. The resulting model is a core by part 5 of Lemma 19.
Minimality
Typically we are interested in the case when M is the class of models of a theory T ; in this case we may use the phrases T -minimal, or T -i-minimal.
Here are some local characterizations of i-minimality.
Lemma 24. The following are equivalent for a model A in M.
1.
A is i-minimal for M.
No proper submodel of A is in M.
3. Whenever B is in M and k : B → A is an injective homomorphism, then h is an isomorphism.
Proof. For 1 ⇒ 2, if B were a proper submodel of A in M then the inclusion map would contradict i-minimality of A. For 2 ⇒ 3, suppose k : B → A is injective, with B ∈ M. The image of k in A is isomorphic with B, hence is in M, so by 2 is not a proper submodel.
The implication 3 ⇒ 1 is easy.
Submodel-minimality
One could imagine yet another notion of minimality, where the preorder on models is given by the submodel relation. This notion could be described without any reference to homomorphisms (the notion of submodel could be defined natively, although we have not done so): for a theory T , a model A of T is "submodel-minimal" for T precisely if no proper submodel of A is a model of T . But Lemma 24 says that this notion is precisely the same as i-minimality. This observation will be useful when we turn to computing i-minimal models.
Relationships between a-minimal and i-minimal
An i-minimal model is not necessarily a-minimal.
Example 25. Let T be
Let A have one element a with
Then A is i-minimal but not a-minimal. The model B with two elements a 1 and a 2 such that
is strictly below A in the preorder. (B is a-minimal for T .)
An a-minimal model is not necessarily i-minimal.
Let A have two elements a 1 and a 2 with
Then A is a-minimal. But A is not i-minimal: the induced model determined by a 1 is a model of T .
However, an a-minimal model which is a core will be i-minimal.
Lemma 27. If A is a-minimal for T and is a core, then A is i-minimal for T .
Proof. Suppose B is a model of T and j : B → A is injective. Since A is aminimal, there is a homomorphism h : A → B. The composition j • h is an endomorphism of A. Since A is a core this map is injective, so h is injective, and A ≈ i B.
Lemma 27 is attractive in the sense that it suggests striving for the best of both worlds (i-minimality and a-minimality simultaneously) by computing a-minimal cores. Unfortunately, if a theory T fails to be geometric then the core of a model of T can fail to be a model of T . Thus we cannot in general construct cores in our model-finding. Example 28. Let T be the theory that says ∃x.P (x) and that there exist exactly two elements (the latter sentence is not geometric). The model M with two elements, with P holding of each of them, is a-minimal, but not i minimal. The model with two elements and P holding of just one of them is i-minimal. The core of M has one element, with P holding, but this is not a model of T .
i-minimizing an a-minimal model Suppose M is a-minimal. Let K be an i-minimal model below M, that is, K is i-minimal and there is an injective h : K → M. Then K is both i-minimal and a-minimal. It is a-minimal because it is a-hom equivalent to M (we have h : K → M by assumption, and there is a map M → K by virtue of M being a-minimal). So the true best of both worlds is: first a-minimize, then i-minimize.
Computing i-minimal Models
As noted in Lemma 24, finding an i-minimal model for T which is i given a model M is equivalent to finding a minimal submodel of M satisfying T .
This leads to the following procedure, originally developed for use in the Aluminum tool [NSD + 13]
• fix the universe
• fix the negative literals
• negate some positive literals until no change.
Recall that δ C is a sentence expressing the fact that every element of the domain(s) of a model is named by a constant in C.
For this algorithm we use the notation flip P to denote {¬α | α is an atomic sentence, P |= ¬α} ∧ {¬β | β is an atomic sentence, P |= β} Note in particular that if c and c ′ are constants naming distinct elements of a model P, then c = c ′ is one of the conjuncts of flip P .
Algorithm 29 (i-Minimize).
input: theory T and model M |= T output: model P |= T such that N is i-minimal for T and P i M initialize: set P to be M while T ′ def = T ∪ {flip P } is satisfiable set P to be a model of T ′ return P Lemma 30. Algorithm 29 is correct: if M is a finite model of T then Algorithm 29 terminates on M, and the output P is an i-minimal model of T with
Proof. Each iteration goes down in the i ordering, thus termination. To show that the result is i-minimal for T , it suffices, by Lemma 24, to argue that the result is a minimal T -submodel of the input, under the submodel ordering. But this is clear from the definition of the sentences flip .
Computing a-minimal Models
What about computing a-minimal models? That's harder. First of all, for a given theory there might be no finite a-minimal models at all. Example: the theory with one unary function and no axioms. The initial (hence unique minimal) model of this theory is the natural numbers. Another way to put this is: the preorder is not well-founded in general.
If we bound the size of the domain(s) of our models then a-minimal models exist: the preorder is well-founded, so the set of minimal elements with respect to this order is non-empty. The question is, how to compute a-minimal models?
We show how to do two things 1. Given model A define a sentence homTo A such that B |= homTo A if and only if B A.
2. Given model A define a sentence homFrom A such that B |= homFrom A if and only if A B.
We define avoid A to be ¬homFrom A , so that B |= avoid A if and only if A B.
Then the process of finding an a-minimal model for T below a given model A is to iterate the process of constructing a model that is strictly below A in the ordering, which is to say, a model B such that there is a homomorphism from B to A but not homomorphism from A → B.
That is:
given A |= T , construct the theory
If this is unsatisfiable then A is T minimal. If this is satisfiable, let
A' be a model of this theory, and iterate.
Important: this process is not guaranteed to terminate for an arbitrary T . But as observed earlier, if at the outset we bound the size of the models to be considered, the process will terminate.
The challenge-suggested earlier-is to define hom-to and hom-from sentences with as much "existential" character as we can manage.
Hom To
This is straightforward "solver programming".
Given model M. We want to characterize those B such that there is a hom h : B → M, by constructing a sentence homTo M .
Algorithm 31 (HomTo).
input: model M over signature Σ.
output: sentence homTo M in an expanded signature Σ + , such that for any model P |= Σ, P M iff there is an expansion P + of P to Σ + with P + |= homTo mM .
define Σ + to be the extension of Σ obtained by adding a set of fresh constants in one-to-one correspondence with the elements of the domain of M adding a function symbol h S : S → S at each sort S define homTo M as the conjunction of the following sentences, one for each function symbol f and predicate R in Σ.
Lemma 32. Suppose M and B are Σ models. There is a Σ hom h : B → M iff there is a model B + |= homTo M such that B is the reduction to Σ of B + .
Proof. Suppose B is the reduction of B + |= homTo M . The interpretation of h in B + defines a function from |B| to |M|. We want to show h is actually a Σ u hom. But that's just what homTo M does.
Suppose B |= Σ and there is a hom h : B → M. We want to show that there is an expansion B + of B satisfying B |= homTo M . The actual homomorphism h determines the interpretation in B + of the symbol h and the interpretation of the new constants c ′ . And since h is a homomorphism, the clauses in homTo M are satisfied.
Hom From and Avoid Cone
Our goal is: given a model M, find a formula to capture not being in the hom-cone of M. This is more interesting that the hom-to problem, because we are going to negate the sentence we build, to express hom-cone-avoidance. So we want to minimize the number of existential quantifiers we use here.
The ideal outcome would be to construct an existential sentence capturing the complement of the hom cone of M. Equivalently we might look for a structure B such that for any A, M A iff A B. This is called "homomorphism duality" in the literature. Such a structure doesn't always exist; and even when it does, it can be exponentially large in the size of M [EPTT17]. So we turn to heuristic methods.
The strategy is to construct a sentence guaranteed to capture the hom-from problem, then refine this sentence to eliminate (some) quantifiers.
Start That's fine, but there are as many existential quantifiers in rep M as there are domain elements. If we were to take homFrom M to be rep M , and define avoid M by simply negating this would lead to a sentence inconvenient for the SMT solver. We can compress the representation, though. This will lead to a nicer representation sentence, which we will take as homFrom mM .
Algorithm 34 (HomFrom).
input: model M over signature Σ output: sentence homTo M over signature Σ, such that for any model P |= Σ, M P iff P |= homFrom M . comment: sentence homFrom M is designed to use as few existential quantifiers as possible, in a "best-effort" sense.
initialize: Set sentence homFrom M to be rep M , the standard model representation sentence for M.
while there is a conjunct in the body of homFrom M of the form f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = x such that x does not occur in any of the t i , replace all occurrences of x in homFrom M by f (t 1 , . . . , t n ). Erase the resulting trivial equation f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) and erase the (∃x) quantifier in front.
Lemma 35. For any model P |= Σ, M P iff P |= homFrom M .
Proof. By Lemma 33 the assertion is true at the initialization step. So it suffices to observe that each transformation of homFrom M yields a logically equivalent sentence.
We may write homFrom M as
so that the transformed sentence is
Suppose P satisfies the first sentence with environment η = x → a, y → b. Then P satisfies the second sentence with η ′ = y → b, since P |= f (t 1 , . . . , t n ) = x under η.
Suppose P satisfies the second sentence with environment δ = y → b. Then P satisfies the first sentence with δ ′ = x → f (δt 1 , . . . δt n ), y → b (this is a suitable environment because x does not occur in f (t 1 , . . . , t n ).)
Example 36. Start with (suppressing the ∧ between equations)
If we work on the equations in the order given we get
and the end result is ∃x
The order in which we do these rules matters. Here is an improved algorithm for applying the rules.
Construct a graph in which the nodes are the variables occuring in the set of equations, and in which, if f x 1 . . . x n → x is a rule, then there is an edge from each x i to x. Then start at the (definitions for the) sources of this graph, and proceed along the graph, that is optimal (conjecture).
Example 37. With the same starting point as above:
Making the graph as defined above we have a 2 is a source, then a 1 then a 0 . If we do things in that order we get
This is ideal.
There is an interesting connection here with initial models, that is, those models that are free, in the categorical sense, over the empty set of generators, among all the models of a theory. For such a model, (i) everything named by a closed term, (ii) no equations between elements that are not forced by T , (iii) no predicate facts true that are not forced by T . If M is initial then there is a hom from it to any model, so the compressed representation sentence could just be "true".
In general the measure of how much a model fails to be initial is given (i) elements not named by terms, (ii) unforced equations between elements (iii) unforced atomic sentences. Capturing those facts about a model characterizes the homs possible out of it; this is what the compressed representation does.
Computing a-minimal Models
Our work on homTo and homFrom leads to an algorithm for a-minimality.
Algorithm 38 (a-Minimize).
input: theory T and model M |= T output: model P |= T such that P is a-minimal for T and N M initialize: set P to be M while T ′ def = T ∪ {homTo P } ∪ {avoid P } is satisfiable set P to be a model of T ′ return P
Computing a Set-of-Support
This is another application of the avoid A technique. Given theory T and model A, if we construct the theory T ′ def = T ∪ {avoid A } then calls to the SMT solver on theory T ′ are guaranteed to return models of T outside the hom-cone of A if any exist. So a set-of-support for T can be generated by iterating this process.
Completeness of this strategy does not require that the models A we work with are minimal. But if we do work with minimal models there will be fewer iterations.
When Σ is a signature, a profile for Σ is a map associating a positive integer with each uninterpreted sort of Σ. These numbers will be treated as upper bounds on the sizes of the sets interpreting sorts in the models we construct.
Algorithm 39 (SetOfSupport).
input: theory T and profile prf output: a stream M 1 , M 2 , . . . of minimal models of T such that for any prf -model P |= T , there is some i such that M i P.
initialize: set theory T * to be T ∪ {δ prf } while T * is satisfiable
Working with an SMT Solver
This section treats some of the practicalities of using a SMT solver as a tool to build models.
Getting a Model from the Solver
Once the solver has determined that a theory T is satisfiable, and computedinternally-a model for T , the application must extract the model from the solver. But the API for doing this-in the solvers we are familiar with-is quite restricted. In any event, SMT-Lib compliant solvers are not required to make this process particularly convenient. Quoting from the SMT-Lib Standard (v.2.6) [BST
The internal representation of the model A is not exposed by the solver. Similarly to an abstract data type, the model can be inspected only through the three commands below. As a consequence, it can even be partial internally and extended as needed in response to successive invocations of some of these commands.
The three commands alluded to are
• get-value, taking a list of closed quantifier-free terms and returning a corresponding sequence of terms designating values. The notion of "value" is theory-specific; for example, for the theory of arithmetic the values are the numerals.
• get-assignment, a certain restricted version of get-value.
• get-model, returning a list of definitions specifying the meanings of the user-defined function symbols.
In this case the definitions are given in terms of the solver's internal representation of model-values. This is inconvenient for us, for several reasons. First, for an uninterpreted sort there is no theory-defined notion of value. Second, since the solver might create only a partial model internally, Razor may not have all the information it requires (for example for minimization).
To address this, we first ensure that the language we use to communicate with the solver has enough ground terms at each sort to name all elements of a model. We expand on this point in Section 3.3.2. Once this is done, we can query the solver for the values of all functions and predicates, see Section 3.3.3. Finally, in Section 3.3.4 we present a convenient data structure for maintaining models.
The Fresh-Constants Approach
Suppose we have asked the solver to generate a model for theory T , over a signature Σ. We first build an enriched theory T + as follows.
1. Determine a bound, at each uninterpreted sort S, on the number of elements in the model(s) at the sort.
2. If the bound at sort S is n, add fresh constants {c − 1, . . . , c n } to the signature, resulting in an expanded signature Σ + 3. Add to the theory a set of sentences, one for each uninterpreted sort S expressing the constraint that every element of sort S is equal to one of the c i . Note that in a given model it may be the case that distinct constants name the same model element.
Then the (bounded) models of the original theory are precisely the reducts to Σ of the models of T + .
Querying the Model
Since everything is now named by a term (indeed, a constant) we can work with the solver according to the standard, as follows. Suppose the solver has determined T + to be satisfiable.
Here's what we do to scrape a model M out of the solver.
Alternative Approaches
In this section we describe alternative approaches to the problems of model extraction and a-minimization.
There are actually two distinct problems addressed here:
• getting a model out of the solver, and
• a-minimization
They are described together here because the solutions have been implemented together in the same version of Razor, and it is easier to present them together.
The Enumerated Types Approach to Model Extraction
We describe an an alternative approach to building models, which was in fact the first method we implemented. The idea arose as a solution to problems described in Section 3.3.1 for obtaining a complete representation of a model once the solver has determined that a theory is satisfiable.
One solution to this problem was described in Section 3.3.2. Another is described here, as Algorithm ET-First. Roughly speaking, we translate uninterpreted sorts into enumerated sorts, thereby ensuring that every element of the sort is named by a term denoting a value. We can then use the get-value solver function described above to query the solver.
Another Exhaustive Search Approach to a-Minimization
We also show here an approach to a-minimization different from Algorithm 38. This algorithm, Algorithm (ET Last), starts with a given model M, and computes a sequence of i-minimal models, each one constructed to be outside the a-cone of the previous. If and when a final such model K is reached, it is guaranteed to be a-minimal. Since: to say that K is a final model in the sequence is to say that there are no models of T outside the cone of K; and if P were strictly below K in the ordering then P would violate that property. If T is a theory with a finite set of support, this technique is guaranteed to compute an a-minimal model.
The use of i-minimal models in this method is not essential for its correctness, but we do this for efficiency: i-minimization enlarges a model's avoid-cone (even though the cone is defined in terms of a-homomorphisms) and so decreases the numer of iterations required before arriving at a final model.
Algorithm 40 (Enumerated Types).
input: theory T output: a stream of minimal models comprising a set of support for T ET(T ) ≡ 1. M ← ET first(T ). Early work with the ET algorithm showed the performance advantage of using a strand-oriented goal language, but throughout, we retained the capability to use a node-oriented language.
A huge performance boost came to the ET algorithm by compressing the representation of a model a described in Algorithm 34. The US algorithm always compressed representations.
Intuition suggests that the US algorithm will outperform the ET algorithm, and tests bear out that intuition. For each test of lpa, we collected the cpu runtime in seconds, and for each invocation of the model checker, we recorded the number of satisfaction checks requested of Z3. Table 1 shows the results of running lpa on three protocols: NeedhamSchroeder, Reflect, and DoorSEP. Reflect is the simplest protocol we could come up with that has two shapes. See Figure 9 . NO indicates the use of the node-oriented language and SO is for the strand-oriented language. Notice that US always makes far fewer satisfaction checks, and tends to run faster than ET. DoorSEP with the node-oriented language does not terminate in a reasonable amount of time. Analyzing DoorSEP requires three invocations of the model checker. It is the third invocation of the model checker that fails to terminate, however the performance of the second invocation of the model checkers shows the superiority of the US algorithm. It took 1.65 seconds as opposed to 54.21 seconds used by ET. For the equivalent strand-oriented problem, it took the US algorithm 1.11 seconds as opposed to 3.41 seconds used by ET. Thus ET was 16 times faster solving the strand-oriented problem.
Attempts to use lpa on larger protocols proved futile. Larger protocols have a larger set of skeleton axioms. When Z3 looks for a model, it must instantiate each universally quantified variable with each element in its domain. The result 
Conclusion
In this paper, we have studied the mechanisms needed for finding minimal models efficiently in the preorder of all homomorphisms, or in the preorder of embeddings. We have described an implementation of these methods in Razor that orchestrates Z3 to compute the models. Moreover, we have shown how to share labor between Razor and cpsa so that the latter can apply its authentication test solving methods, while Razor is handling the remainder of the axiomatic theory of the protocol together with some non-protocol axioms. The project explored several algorithms for finding minimal models. A significant improvement was described in Section 3.2.6, which explains how to optimize the construction of the sentence avoid A that characterizes the cone of models to avoid a given model. Tests show that the Uninterpreted Sorts algorithm (Algorithm 39) outperforms all others. This algorithm is implemented in a program that can be used outside the lpa framework.
The project identified an axiomatic theory for each protocol that is finely tuned so as to allow Z3 and cpsa to communicate. The theory makes it so that well-formed skeletons can be extracted from Razor models and given to cpsa. With these theories, we successfully analyzed the DoorSEP protocol which includes a trust axiom. Unfortunately, as the size of a protocol grows, so does the size of its theory, and especially its number of universally quantified variables. Z3 becomes very slow when given a large theory. Thus we found that the lpa architecture, as currently implemented, cannot scale to handle nearly all problems of interest.
In future work, we would like to reorganize the software architecture as well as the selection of logical theories to deliver to the components. Z3 is reduced to a molasses-like consistency when given reasonably large domain sizes and a theory with as many universal quantifiers as appear in our protocol theories. This motivates an architecture in which only subtheories are delivered to Z3, preferably governing smaller parts of the domain.
Thus, one would like to do more reasoning locally with a successor to cpsa. Part of this reasoning can take the same form as generating the current cohorts, i.e. applying authentication test-like reasoning to handle authentic and secure channels, mutable global state, and to apply security goals ascertained in previous runs. Moreover, explicit logical axioms may also be handled in the same way, when they are in the form of geometric sequents: Φ =⇒ i∈I ∃y i . Ψ i , where Φ and the Ψ i are conjunctions of atomic formulas, and particularly in the favorable case that the index set I is either a singleton or else the empty set I = ∅. In that favorable case, the inference does not require a case split, but only adding information. In these situations, a cpsa-like program can certainly saturate its skeleton-like partial models. It can then call out to Razor to obtain minimal models of portions of the theory that involve modest domains and limited numbers of nested universal quantifiers.
